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THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: 
ISSUES FOR PHASE 1 DEPLOYMENT 
From i t s  i n c e p t  i o n  i n  1984,  t h e  S t r a t e g i c  Defense I n i t i a t i v e  (SDI)  
was d e s c r i b e d  o f f i c i a l l y  a s  a  long-term t echno logy  r e s e a r c h  program t o  
d e t e r m i n e  t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  of  d e v e l o p i n g  d e f e n s e s  a g a i n s t  t h e  t h r e a t  of 
b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  a t t a c k .  While SDI was s t r u c t u r e d  t o  make p o s s i b l e  a  
deployment  d e c i s i o n  i n  t h e  e a r l y -  t o  mid-1990s, s p e c i f i c  deployment  g o a l s  
were unde f ined .  T h i s  ambigu i ty  has  been s u b s t a n t i a l l y  reduced  now t h a t  
t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  h a s  d e f i n e d ,  and i s  p u r s u i n g ,  a  f i r s t  phase  SDI 
c o n c e p t  ( P h a s e  1 )  c o n s i s t i n g  of  v a r i o u s  weapons, s e n s o r s ,  and b a t t l e  
management e l e m e n t s ,  w i t h  deployment d e c i s i o n s  i n  t h e  e a r l y  1990s and 
p o s s i b l e  deployment  i n  t h e  mid- t o  l a t e -1990s .  
While no  d e c i s i o n  has  been made t o  dep loy  such  a  sys t em,  t h e  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  new e f f o r t s  a r e  b r i n g i n g  impor t an t  changes  t o  t h e  SDI 
program and r a i s i n g  v a r i o u s  p o l i c y  i s s u e s .  A s u b s t a n t i a l  p a r t  of t h e  
program w i l l  now f o c u s  on b r i n g i n g  v a r i o u s  sys tem e l e m e n t s  t o  a  s t a g e  
where a  d e c i s i o n  can  be made whether  t o  dep loy  o r  n o t .  Cos t  e s t i m a t e s  of 
p u r s u i n g  Phase  1 d e m o n s t r a t i o n  and v a l i d a t i o n  ove r  t h e  n e x t  4 t o  5 y e a r s  
r a n g e  from $10 b i l l i o n  t o  $25 b i l l i o n .  Changes i n  program d i r e c t i o n  and 
pu rpose  a r e  e v i d e n t  i n  t h e  FY89 d e f e n s e  budget r e q u e s t  t o  Congress .  
The s t a t e d  purpose  of  t h e  Phase 1 SDI sys tem would be  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  
U.S. d e t e r r e n c e  by moving toward a  s t a b l e  ba l ance  between o f f e n s i v e  and 
d e f e n s i v e  Eorces .  A Phase 1 SDI sys tem would a l s o  p r o v i d e  some p o p u l a t i o n  
d e f e n s e ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  T h e i r  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  Phase  1  i s  
m u l t i f a c e t e d .  I t  would per form a  s p e c i f i c  m i l i t a r y  m i s s i o n  t o  deny t h e  
S o v i e t s  t h e i r  war t ime o b j e c t i v e s  and p rov ide  some p o p u l a t i o n  d e f e n s e ,  
compel S o v i e t  o p e r a t i o n a l  and d o c t r i n a l  changes i n  t h e i r  b a l l i s t i c  
m i s s i l e  f o r c e s ,  and l a y  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  more e f f e c t i v e  fol low-on SDI 
deployment phases .  
The d e c i s i o n  t o  p u r s u e  an i n i t i a l  deployment  concep t  i s  h i g h l y  
c o n t r o v e r s i a l .  C r i t i c s  c h a r g e  t h a t  t h e  e v e n t u a l  sy s t em w i l l  n o t  be 
s u r v i v a b l e  a g a i n s t  S o v i e t  a t t a c k  no r  be e f f e c t i v e  a g a i n s t  r e a d i l y  
a v a i l a b l e  S o v i e t  coun te rmeasu re s .  C r i t i c s  s t i l l  q u e s t i o n  t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  
of d e v e l o p i n g  and d e p l o y i n g  such  a  c o s t l y  system. 
S e v e r a l  key  p o l i c y  i s s u e s  a r e  r a i s e d  b y  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a c t i o n s  t h u s  
f a r .  For  example,  on t h e  m a t t e r  of  whether  a l i m i t e d  SDI sys tem s h o u l d  be 
pu r sued  and deployed  a s  an e lement  of  U.S. s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y ,  many 
d i f f e r e n t  p e r s p e c t i v e s  a r e  deve lop ing .  Pursu ing  an i n i t i a l  deployment  
concep t  a l s o  r a i s e s  q u e s t i o n s  abou t  compliance w i t h  t h e  ABH T r e a t y  and 
c o n t i n u e d  U.S. commitment t o  t h e  t r e a t y .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  budget  c o s t s  of 
p u r s u i n g  t h i s  e f f o r t  r a i s e  key concerns  i n  t h i s  e r a  of  d e c l i n i n g  d e f e n s e  
budge t s .  
ISSUE DEFINITIW 
A c e n t r a l  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  p o l i c y  i s s u e  t h a t  t h i s  N a t i o n  h a s  f a c e d  
f o r  t h e  p a s t  40 y e a r s ,  and w i l l  f a c e  f o r  t h e  f o r e s e e a b l e  f u t u r e ,  i s  what 
s t r a t e g i c  p o s t u r e  t o  a d o p t  v i s - a - v i s  t h e  S o v i e t  Union. Among t h e  many 
c h o i c e s  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  must make on s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y  t o d a y  i s  w h e t h e r  
t o  d e v e l o p  a  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  d e p l o y  a n  SDI sys tem.  Whatever  t e c h n o l o g i e s  
c o u l d  u l t i m a t e l y  be i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  a n  i n i t i a l  d e p l o y m e n t ,  s e v e r a l  
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  p o l i c y  i s s u e s  a r e  r a i s e d .  Given t h e i r  i m p l i c a t i o n s  a n d  
t r a d e o f f s ,  t h e  i s s u e  f o r  C o n g r e s s  i s  w h e t h e r  t o  fund  t h e  Reagan 
~ d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  commitment t o  and s c h e d u l e  f o r  p u r s u i n g  a n  i n i t i a l  SDI 
dep loyment  c o n c e p t .  
T h i s  i s s u e  b r i e f  d e s c r i b e s  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  p l a n s  f o r  P h a s e  1 
d e v e l o p m e n t  and f o r  an  i n i t i a l  deployment  c o n c e p t ,  t r a c k s  o n g o i n g  a c t i o n s  
and program m o d i f i c a t i o n s ,  examines  key i m p l i c a t i o n s  and t r a d e o f f s ,  and  
r a i s e s  some p o l i c y  o p t i o n s  f o r  C o n g r e s s .  
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 
Admini s t r a t i o n  D e c i s i o n s  R e g a r d i n g  Phased  Deployment 
I n  J u l y  1987 ,  t h e  Defense  A c q u i s i t i o n  Board (DAB), t h e  P e n t a g o n  body 
c h a r g e d  w i t h  t h e  t a s k  of r e v i e w i n g  a l l  Depar tment  of D e f e n s e  (DOD) 
p r o g r a m s ,  made a  M i l e s t o n e  I recommendat ion -- t h e  d e m o n s t r a t  i o n  and  
v a l i d a t i o n  r e v i e w  -- f o r  t h e  SDI program. The DAB r e c o r n e n d a t i o n  
i d e n t i f i e d  a  f u t u r e  S o v i e t  t h r e a t  ( d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  D e f e n s e  I n t e l l i g e n c e  
Agency)  and  a p p r o v e d  a  set  o f  m i l i t a r y  m i s s i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t s  ( d e t e r m i n e d  by 
t h e  J o i n t  C h i e f s  of S t a f f ,  o r  JCS) t o  be a d d r e s s e d  by a n  i n i t i a l  SDI 
d e p l o y m e n t ,  and a p p r o v e d  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  phased dep loyment  ( d e f i n e d  b e l o w ) .  
The DAB advanced  s e v e r a l  m a j o r  SDI t e c h n o l o g y  programs ( c o n s i s t i n g  o f  
s e n s o r s ,  weapons ,  and  b a t t l e  management e l e m e n t s )  w i t h  a n  accompanying  
s y s t e m  a r c h i t e c t u r e ,  a s  t h e  c u r r e n t l y  f a v o r e d  c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  a n  i n i t i a l  
SDI dep loyment  i n  t h e  mid-1990s. The DAB r e c o m n e n d a t i o n  was a p p r o v e d  by 
D e f e n s e  S e c r e t a r y  Weinberger  i n  Sep tember  1987 ,  t h u s  b r i n g i n g  SDI f o r m a l l y  
i n t o  t h e  DOD weapons a c q u i s i t i o n  p r o c e s s .  
The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  d e f i n e s  phased dep loyment  a s  t h e  i n c r e m e n t a l  
dep loyment  o f  i n c r e a s i n g 1  y  s o p h i  s t  i c a t e d  and c a p a b l e  SDI t e c h n o l o g i e s  i n  
d i s t i n c t  s t e p s  o v e r  s e v e r a l  d e c a d e s .  While  t h e  SDI O r g a n i z a t i o n  (SDIO) 
s a y s  t h a t  p h a s e d  deployment  i s  an e f f o r t  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  d e t e r r e n c e  by 
moving t o w a r d  a  s t a b l e  b a l a n c e  between o f f e n s i v e  and d e f e n s i v e  f o r c e s ,  
many would a r g u e  t h a t  P r e s i d e n t  Reagan e n v i s i o n s  t h e  e v e n t u a l  r e p l a c e m e n t  
of d e t e r r e n c e  b a s e d  on o f f e n s i v e  n u c l e a r  weapons w i t h  d e f e n s e s .  The 
number o f  p h a s e s  would be i n d e t e r m i n a t e .  Phased dep loyment  i s  s e e n  by t h e  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a s  t h e  most  r e a s o n a b l e  means t o  a c h i e v e  t h e  l e v e l s  of 
b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  d e f e n s e  e n v i s i o n e d  by P r e s i d e n t  Reagan. 
The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  h a s  s a i d  t h a t  e a c h  deployment  p h a s e  would be 
r e q u i r e d  t o  p e r f o r m  a  s p e c i f i c  m i l i t a r y  m i s s i o n ,  compel c h a n g e s  i n  S o v i e t  
b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  f o r c e s ,  and l a y  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  s u b s e q u e n t  dep loyment  
p h a s e s .  T h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  i m p o r t a n t  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of c r i t i c a l l y  
e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  m e r i t s  of a n  i n i t i a l  SDI dep loyment .  
A S t r a t e g i c  Defense  System (SDS) e n v i s i o n e d  by t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
would t h e n  be t h e  c u l m i n a t i o n  of s e v e r a l  SDI deployment phases .  Each 
phase  would s e e k  t o  improve t h e  i n i t i a l  sy s t em and p r o v i d e  a d d i t i o n a l  
c a p a b i l i t y  t o  per form new and more demanding m i s s i o n s .  The SDS would 
c o n s i s t  of an  i n t e g r a t e d  sys tem of b a t t l e  management; command, c o n t r o l ,  
and  communicat ions (C3) ;  s e n s o r s ;  and weapons. Accord ing  t o  t h e  
Admini  s c  r a t  i o n ,  t h e  SDS would be des igned  t o  be c o s t - e f f e c t i v e ,  
s u r v i v a b l e ,  and m i l i t a r i l y  e f f e c t i v e ,  t h u s  s t a y i n g  ahead  of  a n y  e v o l v i n g  
S o v i e t  t h r e a t .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  SDS would s t r i v e  t o  be r e s p o n s i v e  t o  U.S. 
conrnand a u t h o r i t i e s  d u r i n g  peace ,  c r i s i s ,  and war. 
The Elements  o f  Phase  1 
As approved f o r  advanced development by t h e  DAB, t h e  Phase  1  
s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e  sys tem would c o n s i s t  o f  numerous space-  and ground-based 
i n t e r c e p t o r s  and s e n s o r s .  These programs,  which have  r e c e i v e d  M i l e s t o n e  I 
a p p r o v a l ,  a r e  based  on more t r a d i t i o n a l  t e c h n o l o g i e s .  See Figure 1. The 
s i x  c a n d i d a t e  SDI e l emen t s  approved f o r  advanced development  i n c l u d e :  
- - two nonnuc lea r  m i s s i l e  i n t e r c e p t o r s  -- t h e  Space-based 
I n t e r c e p t o r  (SBI)  and t h e  ground-based Exoatmospher ic  
R e e n t r y  V e h i c l e  I n t e r c e p t o r  Subsystem (ERIS);  
-- t h r e e  s e n s o r  e l e m e n t s  -- t h e  space-based Boost S u r v e i l l a n c e  
and Track ing  System (BSTS), Space-based S u r v e i l l a n c e  and 
T r a c k i n g  System (SSTS), and Ground-based S u r v e i l l a n c e  and 
T r a c k i n g  System (GSTS) ; and,  
- - a  B a t t l e  ~anagement /Comnand,  C o n t r o l ,  and Communications 
( B M / c ~ )  ne twork  t h a t  w i l l  have t o  be developed .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  development of an  Advanced Launch System (ALS) -- a  
new s p a c e  v e h i c l e  -- i s  c o n s i d e r e d  e s s e n t i a l  t o  meet t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  
l aunch  n e e d s  of d e p l o y i n g  t h e  s p a c e  e l e m e n t s  of t h e  Phase  1 sys t em i n  t h e  
mid- t o  l a t e -1990s .  But because  t h e  ALS i s  i n t ended  t o  a d d r e s s  a b r o a d e r  
r a n g e  of c i v i l  and m i l i t a r y  space  l aunch  needs ,  DAB a p p r o v a l  i s  b e i n g  
pu r sued  s e p a r a t e l y .  
The two m i s s i l e  i n t e r c e p t o r  sys tems would be deployed  i n  two l a y e r s .  
The f i r s t  l a y e r  would u s e  t h e  SBI t o  t r y  and a t t a c k  S o v i e t  b a l l i s t i c  
m i s s i l e s  i n  s p a c e  w i t h i n  t h e  f i r s t  s e v e r a l  minu te s  of t h e i r  f l i g h t  bu t  
b e f o r e  t h e i r  warheads a r e  r e l e a s e d .  The second t ie r  would u s e  ERIS 
( p e r h a p s  supplemented  by SBI)  t o  t r y  and a t t a c k  s p e c i f i c  warheads a f t e r  
t h e y  had been d i s p e n s e d  from t h e  m i s s i l e  d u r i n g  t h e  midcourse  phase  of 
t h e  warheads '  t r a j e c t o r y  i n  space .  Var ious  s e n s o r s  would be  d e s i g n e d  t c  
t r y  and p r o v i d e  f o r  t a r g e t  a c q u i s i t i o n ,  t r a c k i n g ,  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  and k i l l  
a s s e s s m e n t .  B M / C ~  e l e m e n t s  would be r e q u i r e d  t o  p l a y  a  c e n t r a l  r o l e  i n  
c o o r d i n a t i n g  t h e  sys tem w i t h  o t h e r  s t r a t e g i c  o f f e n s i v e  and t a c t i c a l  
m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s ,  a s  we l l  a s  n a t i o n a l  d i p l o m a t i c  and i n t e l l i g e n c e  
o p e r a t  i o n s .  
C u r r e n t l y ,  t h e  Phase 1  e f f o r t  m a i n t a i n s  an o p t i o n  t o  i n c l u d e  a  
t e r m i n a l  d e f e n s e  l a y e r  ( t o  t r y  and a t t a c k  d u r i n g  t h e  f i n a l  minute  o r  two 
of a  warhead ' s  t r a j e c t o r y  a s  i t  r e e n t e r s  t h e  a tmosphere  toward i t s  
t a r g e t  1. 
T h e  s i x  c a n d i d a t e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  approved by t h e  DAB, assuming 
c o n g r e s s i o n a l  a p p r o v a l  and f u n d i n g ,  a r e  t o  be advanced t o g e t h e r  t o  a  more 
c o o r d i n a t e d  l e v e l  of  t e s t i n g ,  development ,  and i n t e g r a t i o n .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  
t h e  Pentagon c r e a t e d  a  new o f f i c e  ( O p e r a t i o n a l  T e s t  O r g a n i z a t i o n )  f o r  
o v e r s i g h t  of Phase 1  demons t r a t i on  and v a l i d a t i o n .  
The DAB a l s o  d i s c u s s e d  t h e  need t o  ba l ance  and c o o r d i n a t e  t h e  
development  of  more ma tu re ,  near - te rm t e c h n o l o g i e s  w i t h  l onge r - t e rm,  more 
c a p a b l e  t e c h n o l o g i e s .  A Mi l e s tone  I  d e c i s i o n  on a  fol low-on t o  Phase  1 i s  
seen  a s  a n  impor t an t  e lement  o f  a  Mi l e s tone  I 1  d e c i s i o n  f o r  Phase  1. The 
DAB h a s  s a i d  i t  w i l l  r ev i ew  t h e  Phase 1 t e c h n o l o g i e s  and sys t em concep t  on 
an a n n u a l  b a s i s ,  s t a r t i n g  i n  A p r i l  1988. The s t a t e d  purpose  i s  t o  e n s u r e  
development  of an  e f f e c t i v e  and s u r v i v a b l e  system. While some Members 
have s a i d  t h a t  M i l e s t o n e  I 1  cou ld  be  made i n  1992, SDIO now s a y s  t h a t  t h e  
reduced  budget  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  SDI programs ex t end  t h a t  d e c i s i o n  t o  
1993-1994. A t  any  p o i n t ,  o t h e r  t e c h n o l o g i e s  might  be s u b s t i t u t e d  o r  
added ,  depend ing  on t e c h n o l o g i c a l  s u c c e s s ,  t h e  pace  of program f u n d i n g ,  
and changes  i n  t h e  pe rce ived  S o v i e t  t h r e a t .  Actua l  deployment  of t h e  
c u r r e n t  Phase  1 sys tem cou ld  be underway by t h e  mid- t o  l a t e -19908 ,  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  some r e p o r t s .  
The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  d i d  examine o t h e r  deployment i d e a s ,  bu t  s e l e c t e d  
t h i s  Phase  1  concep t  on grounds  t h a t  i t  b e s t  s a t i s f i e d  t h e  JCS m i s s i o n  
r e q u i r e m e n t s .  One a1  t e r n a t  i v e  c o n c e p t ,  f o r  example, i n c l u d e d  t h e  
deployment  of  a  comprehens ive  SDI system -- c o n s i s t i n g  o f  t h e  most c a p a b l e  
and advanced  BMD t e c h n o l o g i e s  -- a l l  a t  once ove r  t h e  s h o r t e s t  p e r i o d  of 
t ime .  Another  major  concept  i n c l u d e d  deployment of  BM/C3 e l e m e n t s ,  
f o l l owed  sometime l a t e r  by space-  and ground-based m i s s i l e  i n t e r c e p t o r s .  
Another  major  concep t  c o n s i s t e d  of a  ground-based weapon sys tem o n l y ,  w i t h  
space-based  s e n s o r s  and BM/C3. 
The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  Case  f o r  Phase  1 Deployment 
A s  mentioned above ,  each  phase  of  t h e  SDS would be  r e q u i r e d  t o  meet 
t h r e e  broad  o b j e c t i v e s .  According t o  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  t h e  Phase  1 
sys tem would s t r i v e  t o  meet t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s  a g a i n s t  t h e  p e r c e i v e d  S o v i e t  
t h r e a t  o f  t h e  mid- t o  la te -1990s  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  manner: 
(1) To perform a  r e q u i r e d  m i l i t a r y  mi s s ion .  The s p e c i f i c  m i s s i o n  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  and sys t em r e l i a b i l i t y  was d e f i n e d  by t h e  JCS a s  SDIO 
p r e p a r e d  f o r  t h e  DAB rev iew.  Although t h o s e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a r e  c l a s s i f i e d ,  
i t  can  be s a i d  t h a t  t h e  major  Phase 1 deployment o b j e c t i v e  i s  t o  e n s u r e ,  
a l b e i t  w i t h  l e s s  t h a n  100% e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  t h e  s u r v i v a l  of  an e f f e c t i v e  
U.S. r e t a l i a t o r y  f o r c e  c a p a b i l i t y .  The purpose  i s  t o  deny t h e  S o v i e t s  
t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s  i n  an i n i t i a l  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  a t t a c k ,  t h u s  d e t e r r i n g  
S o v i e t  a g g r e s s i o n .  The Phase 1 sys tem would c o n t r i b u t e  ( a s  would a l l  
phases  of SDS) t o  t h e  performance of m i s s i o n s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  a s s i g n e d  t o  
U.S. and a l l i e d  s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  d e n i a l  o f  S o v i e t  war a ims ,  
damage 1  i m i t a t i o n ,  s p a c e  c o n t r o l  , and t a c t i c a l  warn ing  and a t  t a c k  
a s s e s s m e n t .  
Accord ing  t o  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  t h e  Phase 1 sys t em would s t r i v e  t o  
t h i n  o u t  an i n i t i a l  S o v i e t  n u c l e a r  a t t a c k  and s e e k  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  h i g h e s t  
v a l u e  U.S. a s s e t s .  I t  i s  s a i d  t h a t  t h i s  o b j e c t i v e  cou ld  be accompl i shed  
by a d o p t i n g  a  2 - t i e r  d e f e n s e  s t r a t e g y .  The goa l  of t h e  f i r s t  t i e r ,  
composed o f  space-based m i s s i l e  i n t e r c e p t o r s ,  would be t o  a t t a c k  S o v i e t  
m i s s i l e s  randomly a f t e r  t h e y  a r e  launched  and b e f o r e  t h e i r  warheads a r e  
r e l e a s e d  t o  b reak  up t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of a  S o v i e t  a t t a c k .  D e s t r o y i n g  a  
m i s s i l e  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  te rms  of  " k i l l i n g 1 '  many 
warheads and decoys  f o r  t h e  p r i c e  of one i n t e r c e p t i o n .  I t s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
goes  much f u r t h e r ,  however. I n  t h e  view o f  t h e  a t t a c k e r ,  h i s  a t t a c k  
becomes u n c o o r d i n a t e d  and u n p r e d i c t a b l e ,  l e a d i n g  t o  t h e  a t t a c k e r ' s  l o s s  of 
c o n f i d e n c e  i n  a t t a i n i n g  a l l  h i s  o b j e c t i v e s .  
The s t a t e d  g o a l  o f  t h e  second t i e r ,  composed of  space-  and 
ground-based m i s s i l e  i n t e r c e p t o r s ,  would be t o  a t t a c k  o n l y  s e l e c t e d  S o v i e t  
warheads t h a t  s u r v i v e d  t h e  f i r s t  t i e r .  The warheads t o  b e  a t t a c k e d  would 
be t h o s e  aimed a t  t a r g e t s  t o  be defended .  According t o  SDIO, t h e  
u n c e r t a i n t y  g e n e r a t e d  i n  t h e  mind of t h e  a t t a c k e r  by t h i s  2 - t i e r  s t r a t e g y  
would be  profound i n  r e d u c i n g  S o v i e t  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  a  p o t e n t i a l  f i r s t  
s t r i k e  a t t a c k  and i n  a t t a i n i n g  S o v i e t  o b j e c t i v e s .  
While  t h e  p r imary  purpose  of Phase 1 deployment  i s  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  
s u r v i v a b i l i t y  o f  a c o r e  d e t e r r e n t  f o r c e ,  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  adds  t h a t  
some l e v e l  of p o p u l a t i o n  d e f e n s e  cou ld  be a f f o r d e d  i n  two ways. F i r s t ,  
b e c a u s e  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  would be t o  d e s t r o y  S o v i e t  m i s s i l e s  randomly i n  t h e  
b o o s t  a n d  p o s t - b o o s t  s t a g e s ,  many p o t e n t i a l  t a r g e t s  l o c a t e d  n e a r  
p o p u l a t i o n  c e n t e r s  would n o t  be h i t .  Proponents  add t h a t  t a r g e t s  n e a r  
p o p u l a t i o n  a r e a s  cou ld  be defended  s e l e c t i v e l y  w i t h  t h e  mid-course 
d e f e n s e  t i e r .  Second,  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  adds  t h a t  t h e  Phase  1 sys t em 
i t s e l f  would d e t e r  t h e  S o v i e t s  from s t a r t i n g  any war i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e .  
( 2 )  To compel changes  - o p e r a t i o n a l  and t e c h n i c a l  - i n  S o v i e t  
b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i L e  f o r c e s .  Through deployment of  a  Phase  1 sys t em,  t h e  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  hopes t o  r educe  t h e  S o v i e t ' s  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  m i l i t a r y  
u t i l i t y  of t h e i r  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  f o r c e .  According t o  SDIO, Phase  1 
deployment  w i l l  compel changes  ( f a v o r a b l e  t o  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s )  i n  S o v i e t  
s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e s  o p e r a t i o n s  and s t r a t e g y  by r educ ing  t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  of 
S o v i e t  p l a n n e r s  i n  p r e d i c t i n g  t h e  outcome of  a  b a l l i s t i c  missile a t t a c k  
and l e a v i n g  S o v i e t  s t r a t e g i c  p l a n n e r s  u n c e r t a i n  o f  t h e  number of warheads 
t o  a p p l y  t o  s p e c i f i c  U.S. t a r g e t s .  Such changes  w i l l  r educe  S o v i e t  
c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e i r  p r e f e r r e d  a t t a c k  s t r a t e g y  and i n v a l i d a t e  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of  a  S o v i e t  f i r s t  s t r i k e .  
The S o v i e t s  would have two r a t i o n a l  c h o i c e s ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  One would be t o  reduce  t h e i r  emphasis  on s t r a t e g i c  
n u c l e a r  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  and i n c r e a s e  emphasis  on t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  
bombers and c r u i s e  m i s s i l e s ,  which,  i t  i s  a rgued ,  are less d e s t a b i l i z i n g  
and dange rous  because  t h e y  a r e  s lower  than  b a l l  i s t i c  m i s s i l e s ,  c anno t  be 
used r e l i a b l y  t oday  a s  f i r s t - s t r i k e  weapons, and -- i n  t h e  c a s e  of 
bombers -- c a n  be r e c a l l e d .  
The o t h e r  c h o i c e  -- t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a r g u e s  -- i s  t h a t  t h e  
development  and deployment of a  Phase 1 sys tem w i l l  p r o v i d e  arms c o n t r o l  
l e v e r a g e .  SDIO a r g u e s  t h a t  Phase 1 deployment w i l l  c r e a t e  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  
b o t h  s i d e s  t o  r educe  g r e a t l y  t h e i r  o f f e n s i v e  f o r c e s  and move toward 
g r e a t e r  r e l i a n c e  on d e f e n s e s .  P r e s i d e n t  Reagan has  s a i d  on many o c c a s i o n s  
t h a t  t h e  u l t i m a t e  g o a l  i s  t o  e l i m i n a t e  o f f e n s i v e  n u c l e a r  weapons and r e l y  
i n s t e a d  on a  defense-dominated s t r a t e g y .  The deployment p r o c e s s  i t s e l f ,  
i t  i s  a r g u e d ,  i s  a  s t r a t e g y  t o  demons t r a t e  U.S. i n t e n t i o n  t o  expand 
d e f e n s e s  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  any S o v i e t  a c t i o n s .  According t o  t h e  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  " t h e  mere development of t h e  o p t i o n  f o r  phased deployment  
of s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e  can  h e l p  m o t i v a t e  S o v i e t  a c c e p t a n c e  of  U.S. arms 
r e d u c t i o n s  p roposa l s . "  I f  such  p r o p o s a l s  were t h e n  a c c e p t e d ,  i t  i s  
a r g u e d ,  phased deployment p l a n s  cou ld  be a d j u s t e d  a c c o r d i n g l y  w i t h  l e s s  
a m b i t i o u s  upgrading .  
( 3 )  To l a y  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  improved, follow-on deployment  phases .  
The Phase  1 sys t em i s  t o  s e t  t h e  s t a g e  f o r  a  f o l l o r o n  deployment  i n  
s e v e r a l  ways. I t  w i l l :  ( 1 )  p rov ide  i n i t i a l  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  b a l l i s t i c  
m i s s i l e  a t t a c k s  and a  f o u n d a t i o n  on which subsequent  phases  can  b u i l d  and 
e f f i c i e n t l y  expand;  ( 2 )  e s t a b l i s h  U.S. d e f e n s i v e  c a p a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  most 
c r i t i c a l  p o r t i o n s  of a  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  t r a j e c t o r y ;  (3 )  p u t  i n  p l a c e  an  
o r g a n i z e d  m i l i t a r y  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ;  and ( 4 )  p r o v i d e  r e l i a b l e  t r a i n i n g  and 
o p e r a t i o n a l  e x p e r i e n c e .  
No fol low-on t o  t h e  Phase 1  system has  been d e f i n e d .  Accord ing  t o  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f f i c i a l s ,  a  Phase 2  deployment cou ld  c o n s i s t  of a n y t h i n g  
from more e f f e c t i v e  Phase  1 t e c h n o l o g i e s  t o  more advanced s e n s o r s  o r  
weapons, such  a s  l a s e r s  and p a r t i c l e  beams. The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a s s e r t s  
t h a t  i t  w i l l  m a i n t a i n  program b a l a n c e ,  but  t h e r e  i s  some a m b i g u i t y  a s  t o  
how. Some o f f i c i a l s  have s t a t e d  t h a t  SDIO w i l l  a l l o c a t e  h a l f  o f  t h e  SDI 
budget  t o  development  of  t h e  Phase 1  concep t ,  and t h e  b a l a n c e  f o r  t h e  
t e c h n o l o g i e s  of subsequen t  phases .  Other  o f f i c i a l s  a s s e r t  more g e n e r a l l y  
t h a t  SDIO w i l l  m a i n t a i n  a  ba lanced  program -- one t h a t  i n v e s t i g a t e s  bo th  
n e a r - t e r m  s y s t e m s  a n d  t e c h n o l o g i e s  and more e x o t i c  sys t ems  and 
t e c h n o l o g i e s .  
A d e c i s i o n  t o  p u r s u e  a  p a r t i c u l a r  Phase 2  concept  would depend i n  
l a r g e  p a r t  on whether  o r  how t h e  S o v i e t s  might respond t o  Phase  1 
deployment  (whe the r  t h e  S o v i e t s  a r e  c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l  o r  c o o p e r a t i v e ) ,  any  
changes  i n  o b j e c t i v e s ,  and f u r t h e r  p r o g r e s s  i n  t h e  SDI program. 
C r i t i c i s m  of Phase 1 
S i n c e  i t s  i n c e p t i o n ,  SDI has  proven t o  be one of t h e  most h i g h l y  
c o n t e n t i o u s  d e f e n s e  programs i n  h i s t o r y .  Much of  t h e  c o n t r o v e r s y ,  f o r  
example,  c e n t e r e d  on broad c r i t i q u e s  o f  t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  of an  e f f e c t i v e  
SDI sys t em and t h e  t remendous p o l i t i c a l  c h a l l e n g e s  SDI posed t o  U.S. 
d ip lomacy.  Debate o v e r  s p e c i f i c  imp1 i c a t  i ons  and t e c h n i c a l  problems of 
SDI deployment  h a s  been d i f f i c u l t ,  l a r g e l y  because  of t h e  absence  of 
w e l l - d e f i n e d  deployment  g o a l s .  Now t h a t  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i s  p u r s u i n g  a  
Phase 1 development  and deployment concept  w i th  a  p r o v i s i o n a l l y  s p e c i f i e d  
s e t  of SDI t e c h n o l o g i e s  f o r  t h e  1990s ,  t h e  SDI d e b a t e  may we l l  sha rpen .  
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The d e b a t e  o v e r  Phase 1 i s  beg inn ing .  I n  broad  terms, some s e e  
Phase  1 a s  an  a t t e m p t  t o  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e  phased deployment  and b u i l d  
program momentum b e f o r e  Reagan l e a v e s  o f f i c e .  I t  i s  a l s o  s e e n  by many a s  
o v e r l y  a m b i t i o u s ,  complex, and c o s t l y .  S t i l l  o t h e r s  b e l i e v e  a  comnitment 
t o  Phase  1 means an  i r r e v o c a b l e  comnitment t o  e n d l e s s  deployments  of 
s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e s .  
Beyond t h i s ,  t h e r e  a r e  few d e t a i l e d  p u b l i c  c r i t i c i s m s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  
d i s c u s s i o n .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  s e v e r a l  i s s u e s  r a i s e d  by t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  
p u r s u i t  o f  Phase  1 a r e  l i k e l y  t o  r e c e i v e  c r i t i c a l  examina t ion .  Most SDI 
c r i t i c s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  q u e s t i o n  t h e  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  and m i l i t a r y  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h e  Phase 1 sys tem,  a s  we l l  a s  t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  of 
d e v e l o p i n g  and dep loy ing  t h e  Phase 1 t e c h n o l o g i e s  f o r  t h e  1990s. 
S u r v i v a b i l i t y  I s s u e s  
Some c r i t i c s  of t h e  proposed Phase 1 sys tem doubt  t h a t  i t  w i l l  be 
s u r v i v a b l e .  They do n o t  b e l i e v e  t h e  sys tem cou ld  per form i t s  r e q u i r e d  
m i s s i o n  i f  t h e  S o v i e t s  dec ided  t o  a t t a c k  t h e  system's space-based  
components w i t h  ground- o r  a i r - l aunched  a n t i s a t e l l i t e  (ASAT) weapons. Fo r  
example,  some a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t s  cou ld  u se  i n e x p e n s i v e  sound ing  ( h i g h  
a l t i t u d e )  r o c k e t s  w i t h  mode ra t e ly  advanced gu idance  sys t ems  t o  a t t a c k  some 
s p a c e - b a s e d  s e n s o r s  and  weapon e l e m e n t s  of t h e  Phase  1 sys tem.  
Conce ivab ly ,  c r i t i c s  c h a r g e ,  most S o v i e t  m i s s i l e s  cou ld  be mod i f i ed  f o r  
such  a  m i s s i o n .  A l so ,  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a s s e r t s  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t s  c o u l d  
have  a n  o p e r a t i o n a l  ground-based l a s e r  ASAT weapon by t h e  e a r l y  1990s.  
Many o b s e r v e r s  might  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  
space-based  Phase  1 e l emen t s  i s  l e s s  impor t an t  t h a n  o v e r a l l  m i s s i o n  
s u r v i v a b i l i t y  e . ,  t h e  sys tem cou ld  l o s e  a  few e l e m e n t s  and s t i l l  
pe r fo rm i t s  m i s s i o n ) .  C r i t i c s  of Phase 1 c h a r g e  t h a t  t h e  sys t em a s  
p r e s e n t l y  con templa t ed  i n c l u d e s  an  i n a d e q u a t e  number of BSTS and SSTS 
s e n s o r  p l a t f o r m s ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  l o s s  of o n l y  a  few of t h e s e  components 
would make i t  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  Phase 1 mis s ion  cou ld  be r e a l i z e d .  
Some c r i t i c s  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  space-based e l e m e n t s  of Phase  1 c o u l d  n o t  
s u r v i v e  t h e  e f f e c t s  (e .g . ,  X-rays) of n u c l e a r  e x p l o s i o n s  i n  s p a c e .  (The 
s o u r c e  o f  t h e s e  e x p l o s i o n s  cou ld  be S o v i e t  n u c l e a r  ASATs o r  S o v i e t  
warheads f u s e d  t o  d e t o n a t e  when a t t a c k e d  by i n t e r c e p t o r s . )  The e f f e c t s  of 
n u c l e a r  e x p l o s i o n s  i n  space ,  t h e y  a r g u e ,  canno t  be f u l l y  u n d e r s t o o d  
w i t h o u t  t e s t i n g  i n  s p a c e ,  which i s  p r o h i b i t e d  by t r e a t y .  
Military E f f e c t i v e n e s s  I s s u e s  
Some c r i t i c s  of  Phase 1 a l s o  q u e s t i o n  i t s  m i l i t a r y  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  
They a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  sys tem cou ld  be r e a d i l y  c i rcumvented  i n  many ways t h a t  
a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  s i m p l e  and inexpens ive  f o r  t h e  S o v i e t  Union t o  d e v e l o p ,  y e t  
d i f f i c u l t  and e x p e n s i v e  f o r  t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  c o u n t e r .  
N e a r l y  a l l  o b s e r v e r s  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  most s i g n i f i c a n t  p o t e n t i a l  
coun te rmeasu re  a g a i n s t  t h e  boos t -phase  t i e r  i s  f o r  t h e  S o v i e t s  t o  r educe  
t h e  boos t  time of  t h e i r  ICBMs. While SDI proponen t s  d i s c o u n t  t h i s  
p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  1 9 9 0 s ,  c r i t i c s  b e l i e v e  t h i s  can  be r e a d i l y  
accompl i shed  by s imp le  m o d i f i c a t i o n s .  T h i s  would r educe  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
of SBI by d e c r e a s i n g  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  t ime  f o r  s e n s i n g ,  t a r g e t  a c q u i s i t i o n ,  
and i n t e r c e p t i o n .  While f a s t - b u r n  b o o s t e r s  would n o t  be c o s t - f r e e  t o  t h e  
S o v i e t s ,  t h e y  cou ld  more q u i c k l y  r e p l a c e  t h e i r  f o r c e  o f  o l d e r  SS-17 and 
SS-19 m i s s i l e s ,  f o r  example,  w i t h  newer, f a s t e r  bu rn ing  SS-24s and SS-25s. 
T h i s  would s i g n i f i c a n t l y  r educe  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  SBI l aunch  o p p o r t u n i t y  a t  
minimum S o v i e t  c o s t ,  i t  i s  a rgued ,  These c r i t i c s  doubt  t h a t  SBI 
v e l o c i t i e s  can  be improved upon t o  d e a l  w i th  t h i s  S o v i e t  r e s p o n s e ;  t h e  
f a v o r a b l e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  SBI rocke t  f u e l s  ( low c o s t  and s t o r a b i l i t ~ )  
g i v e  i t  r e l a t i v e l y  Low performance a g a i n s t  f a s t - b u r n  b o o s t e r s .  TO c o u n t e r  
f a s t - b u r n  b o o s t e r s  would  r e q u i r e  u s i n g  h i g h - p r o p e l l e n t  f u e l s  and 
m u l t i p l e - s t a g e  SBIs. C r i t i c s  a r g u e  t h a t  t h i s  would c r e a t e  h e a v i e r  
p l a t f o r m s  and i n c r e a s e  Phase 1 c o s t s  p r o h i b i t i v e l y .  
Most o b s e r v e r s  a g r e e  t h a t  a  key way i n  which t h e  mid-course t i e r  
c o u l d  be  d e f e a t e d  i s  S o v i e t  development of s imp le  and i n e x p e n s i v e  
coun te rmeasu re s .  While SDI proponents  b e l i e v e  t h i s  i s  n o t  l i k e l y  t o  be 
s i g n i f i c a n t  f o r  t h e  1990s,  c r i t i c s  a s s e r t  o t h e r w i s e .  Sugges ted  c o u n t e r s  
i n c l u d e :  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of  S o v i e t  warheads;  decoys (e .g. ,  a l u m i n i z e d  mylar  
b a l l o o n s  and o t h e r  r e p l i c a s  t o  s i m u l a t e  warheads) ;  a e r o s o l  c l o u d s  ( t o  
s i m u l a t e  warheads ) ;  s e n s o r  jamming; and a n t i - s i m u l a t i o n  t e c h n i q u e s  ( f o r  
warhead masking o r  d e c e p t i o n ) .  Because SSTS e f f e c t i v e n e s s  i s  d r i v e n  
l a r g e l y  by t h e  s i z e  of t h e  S o v i e t  t h r e a t ,  i n c r e a s i n g  t h a t  t h r e a t  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  w i t h  decoys  and more warheads,  i t  i s  a r g u e d ,  r e n d e r s  t h e  
mid-course m i s s i o n  i n e f f e c t i v e .  
F e a s i b i l i t y  of  Phase  1 Techno log ie s  
Another  major  c r i t i c i s m  conce rns  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  of  t h e  Phase  1  
e l e m e n t s  t o  meet t h e i r  performance g o a l s  by t h e  mid-1990s. Even 
p roponen t s  a g r e e  t h a t  Phase 1 development and deployment w i l l  r e q u i r e  
h u n d r e d s  o f  m a j o r  a d v a n c e s  i n  d i s p a r a t e  f i e l d s  of r e s e a r c h  and 
e n g i n e e r i n g .  C r i t i c s  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of a l l  t h e s e  coming 
t o g e t h e r  between now and t h e  mid-1990s i s  remote.  Some would a l s o  
q u e s t i o n  whether  t h e  Phase 1 e f f o r t  can be managed e f f e c t i v e l y  and 
e f f i c i e n t l y .  They c i t e  o t h e r  l e s s  complex, s t r a t e g i c  programs s u c h  a s  t h e  
B-1 s t r a t e g i c  bomber and t h e  MX m i s s i l e ,  which have  had numerous problems 
even a f t e r  t h e i r  deployment .  Many a l s o  e x p r e s s  g r a v e  conce rn  a b o u t  
s t a r t i n g  a n  arms r a c e  and t h e n  having  t o  r e l y  upon f u t u r e  unproven and 
e x p e n s i v e  t e c h n o l o g i e s  t o  f o l l o w  Phase 1; t h e y  f e a r  t h a t  i f  such  e x o t i c  
t e c h n o l o g i e s  a r e  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  Phase 1, t h e  r i s k  of n u c l e a r  
war w i l l  a c t u a l l y  i n c r e a s e .  
More s p e c i f i c  t e c h n i c a l  c r i t i c i s m s  f o c u s  on t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  major  
improvements  i n  m i n i a t u r i z a t i o n  of Phase 1  e l emen t s  t o  keep  down c o s t s .  
Many d o  n o t  b e l i e v e  such  r e d u c t i o n s  i n  we igh t ,  s i z e ,  and power 
r e q u i r e m e n t s  a r e  p o s s i b l e  d u r i n g  t h e  proposed time frame f o r  Phase  1. 
The re  i s  a l s o  c r i t i c i s m  of  t h e  BM/C3 network env i saged ,  which i s  
d e s c r i b e d  a s  a  h i g h l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  and d e c e n t r a l i z e d  system. C r i t i c s  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  i n su rmoun tab le  problems w i l l  a r i s e  when a l l  t h e  component 
e l e m e n t s  of  Phase  1 a r e  e v e n t u a l l y  i n t e g r a t e d .  The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n t e n d s  
t o  d e v e l o p  a  N a t i o n a l  T e s t  F a c i l i t y  (NTF) t o  t e s t  and i n t e g r a t e  t h e s e  
e l e m e n t s  under  a r t i f i c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s .  C r i t i c s  q u e s t i o n  t h e  u t i l i t y  of t h e  
a n a l y t i c a l  p r o d u c t  t h a t  w i l l  t hen  be used t o  approve  F u l l - s c a l e  
E n g i n e e r i n g  Development (Mi l e s tone  11) of  Phase  1. What t h e y  f e a r  i s  t h a t  
M i l e s t o n e  I1 w i l l  be  approved  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  i n c r e d i b l y  complex c h a r t s  
and g r a p h s  from t h e  NTF, d a t a  and p r o c e s s e s  t h a t  no one  w i l l  q u i t e  f u l l y  
u n d e r s t a n d .  They a l s o  c h a r g e  t h a t  i t  w i l l  be fundamen ta l ly  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  
conduc t  any  o u t s i d e ,  independent  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s .  F i n a l l y ,  
t h e y  a r e  s k e p t i c a l  of  Phase  1  because  i t  cou ld  n e v e r  be t e s t e d  
r e a l i s t i c a l l y .  
C r i t i c s  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  mid-course d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  of  decoys  and 
warheads i s  c r u c i a l  t o  a n  e f f e c t i v e  Phase 1 sys tem;  such  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  i s  
key t o  t h e  m i s s i o n  of  p r e f e r e n t i a l  and a d a p t i v e  mid-course d e f e n s e .  
C r i t i c s  a s s e r t  i n h e r e n t  problems e x i s t  w i t h  t h e  Phase 1 mid-course s e n s o r s  
b e i n g  developed .  A l l  s e n s o r s  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  s p o o f i n g ,  i n t e r a c t i v e  
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  ( e .g . ,  t h e  n e u t r a l  p a r t i c l e  beam) t o  d e a l  w i t h  decoys  h a s  
been pos tponed  t o  a n o t h e r  phase ,  and t h e  SSTS i s  a lmos t  an  e n t i r e l y  
t h r e a t - d e p e n d e n t  sys tem f a c i n g  major  c h a l l e n g e s  i t s e l f  i n  improving  
r e s o l u t i o n .  
Another  a r e a  t h a t  w i l l  r e c e i v e  c r i t i c a l  a t t e n t i o n  i s  t h e  development  
of a  new space- launch  c a p a b i l i t y .  Some c r i t i c s  a r g u e  t h e  i n f e a s a b i l i t y  of 
b u i l d i n g  a  new l a u n c h  c a p a b i l i t y  by t h e  mid-1990s t o  r e d u c e  Phase  1 sys t em 
c o s t s .  O t h e r  c r i t i c s  a r g u e  t h a t  e n t i r e l y  new and e x p e n s i v e  l a u n c h  
f a c i l i t i e s  w i l l  have  t o  be b u i l t  t o  dep loy  space-based e l e m e n t s  of Phase  1 
o v e r  a  s h o r t  p e r i o d  of time. 
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e s e  more t e c h n i c a l l y - o r i e n t e d  i s s u e s ,  p u r s u i n g  Phase  . 
1 h a s  profound i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y ,  arms c o n t r o l ,  and t h e  
budge t .  These  b roade r  p o l i c y  i s s u e s  a r e  examined i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
s e c t  i on .  
Key P o l i c y  I s s u e s  f o r  Congress  
The deployment  of a  Phase 1 sys tem r a i s e s  s i g n i f i c a n t  q u e s t i o n s  and 
promises  c e r t a i n  c o n t r o v e r s y  r e g a r d i n g  f u t u r e  U.S. s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y ,  t h e  
ABM T r e a t y ,  and c o s t s .  A s  n o t e d ,  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  h a s  made a  comnitment 
t o  p u r s u e  Phase  1, which w i l l  consume a  s i g n i f i c a n t  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  SDI 
budget  t h a t  Congress  w i l l  c o n s i d e r  i n  t h e  FY89 d e f e n s e  b i l l .  Because t h e  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  h a s  p r e s e n t e d  a s p e c i f i c  deployment concep t  and i s  a s k i n g  
Congress  t o  s u p p o r t  s i g n i f i c a n t  fund ing  f o r  Phase 1 d e m o n s t r a t i o n  and 
v a l i d a t i o n  f o r  t h e  n e x t  s e v e r a l  y e a r s ,  most o b s e r v e r s  would a r g u e  t h a t  now 
i s  a n  a p p r o p r i a t e  time t o  c o n s i d e r  whether  o r  how b e s t  t o  pu r sue  t h e  Phase  
1 concep t .  Some o f  t h o s e  i s s u e s  r a i s e d  i n  t h e  growing d e b a t e  a r e  examined 
b r i e f l y  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n .  
S t r a t e g i c  P o l i c y  and Phase  1 Deployment 
There  a r e  a  v a r i e t y  of  s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y  o p t i o n s  t h e  Un i t ed  S t a t e s  h a s  
pursued  and might  c o n t i n u e  p u r s u i n g  t o  e n s u r e  i t s  s e c u r i t y  o v e r  t h e  n e x t  
decade  and beyond. These o p t i o n s  may be pu t  i n t o  f o u r  c a t e g o r i e s .  
The f i r s t  i n c l u d e s  o f f e n s i v e  n u c l e a r  f o r c e  e f f o r t s  t o  e n s u r e  t h e  
m i l i t a r y  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  U.S. n u c l e a r  d e t e r r e n t .  Examples a r e  
m o d e r n i z a t i o n  and p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of n u c l e a r  weapons, and f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e  
changes  ( s u c h  a s  d e c r e a s i n g  U.S. emphasis  on i t s  ICBM f o r c e  and r e l y i n g  
more on n u c l e a r  submar ines ) .  
The second c a t e g o r y  i n c l u d e s  d e f e n s e  s u p p r e s s i o n  e f f o r t s  t o  r e n d e r  
S o v i e t  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s  l e s s  e f f e c t i v e  s o  t h a t  U.S. o f f e n s i v e  f o r c e s  c a n  
e f f e c t i v e l y  p e n e t r a t e  S o v i e t  d e f e n s e s .  Examples a r e  a n t i s a t e l l i t e  
weapons and p e n e t r a t i o n  a i d s  and decoys  on m i s s i l e s .  
The t h i r d  c a t e g o r y  i n c l u d e s  v a r i o u s  d e f e n s i v e  measures t o  e n s u r e  t h e  
s u r v i v a b i l i t y  of t h e  U.S. d e t e r r e n t  f o r c e :  p a s s i v e  d e f e n s e s ,  such  a s  
i n c r e a s e d  a l e r t  r a t e s  f o r  n u c l e a r  weapon sys t ems ,  ICBM m o b i l i t y  i ~ i d ~ e t m a n  
o r  MX), and supe rha rden ing  ICBM s i l o s ;  and a c t i v e  ( s t r a t e g i c )  d e f e n s e s ,  
such  a s  a n t i s u b m a r i n e  w a r f a r e ,  c o n t i n e n t a l  a i r  d e f e n s e ,  and many t y p e s  of 
BMD. 
F i n a l l y ,  arms c o n t r o l  e f f o r t s  can be pursued  t o  r educe  t h e  r i s k  of 
n u c l e a r  war,  min imize  S o v i e t  t h r e a t s  t o  U.S. s t r a t e g i c  n u c l e a r  f o r c e s ,  and 
l i m i t  damage t o  U.S. s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e s  should  war b reak  o u t .  
Because e a c h  c a t e g o r y  has  advan tages  and d i s a d v a n t a g e s ,  t h e  Uni ted  
S t a t e s  p u r s u e s  t h e s e  e f f o r t s  c o n c u r r e n t l y  t o  deny t h e  S o v i e t s  c o n f i d e n c e  
i n  a c h i e v i n g  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s  by f o r c e .  A s  mentioned,  t h e r e  a r e  a  r a n g e  
of o p t i o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  deployment of SDI, which t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  can  
c o n s i d e r .  T h i s  t hen  r a i s e s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of which o p t i o n s  shou ld  be 
emphasized and whether  t o  pu r sue  Phase 1  deployment .  
Phase  1  deployment can  be examined i n  t h i s  s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y  c o n t e x t .  
C u r r e n t l y ,  t h r e e  broad p e r s p e c t i v e s  a r e  deve lop ing .  Each d i f f e r s  
p r i m a r i l y  o v e r  t h e  d e g r e e  t o  which n u c l e a r  weapons and d e t e r r e n c e  shou ld  
p l a y  a  c e n t r a l  r o l e  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  of U.S. s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y .  F i r s t ,  t h e r e  
a r e  some who oppose pu r su ing  Phase 1 ,  f a v o r i n g  o t h e r  s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y  
c h o i c e s .  A second p e r s p e c t i v e  c o u n t e r s  t h a t  deployment of SDI i s  
d e s i r a b l e  and n e c e s s a r y .  O the r s  contend  t h a t  deployment o f  s t r a t e g i c  
d e f e n s e s  i n  some form i s  but  one  of many p o l i c y  o p t i o n s  open t o  s e r i o u s  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  Most o b s e r v e r s  would a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  p o l i c y  d e b a t e  w i l l  
t end  t o  be dominated by t h i s  l a t t e r  p e r s p e c t i v e .  
Each of  t h e s e  p e r s p e c t i v e s  a r e  examined i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  g e n e r a l  
d i s c u s s i o n .  T radeo f f  i s s u e s  a r e  a l s o  r a i s e d  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of t h e  c u r r e n t  
o b j e c t i v e s  of  a  Phase  1 sys tem ( t o  perform a  m i l i t a r y  m i s s i o n ,  compel 
changes  i n  S o v i e t  f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e ,  and l a y  a  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  subsequen t  SDI 
deployment  p h a s e s ) .  
Competing P e r s p e c t i v e s  o f  Phase  1 Deployment 
P u r s u e  W a s e  1 as a n  Element of U.S. S t r a t e g i c  P o l i c y ?  
Yes. Those who s u p p o r t  Phase 1 do so  based on d i f f e r e n t  (some would 
s a y  compet ing)  views of n u c l e a r  d e t e r r e n c e .  Some f i r m l y  b e l i e v e  t h a t  
o f f e n s i v e  n u c l e a r  d e t e r r e n c e  should  be r e p l a c e d  a s  t h e  b a s i s  of  U.S. 
s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y  and t h a t  p o p u l a t i o n  d e f e n s e  shou ld  be  s t r e s s e d ;  many i n  
t h i s  g roup  b e l i e v e  d e t e r r e n c e  i s  a  m o r a l l y  bankrupt  concept .  S t i l l  o t h e r s  
a r g u e  t h a t  U.S. o f f e n s i v e  n u c l e a r  d e t e r r e n c e  i s  n o t  c r e d i b l e  i n  t h e  f a c e  
of S o v i e t  s t r a t e g i c  mode rn i za t ion  and must be s t r e n g t h e n e d .  Debate  w i t h i n  
t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e  f o c u s e s  upon whether  and how b e s t  t o  r e p l a c e  o r  
s t r e n g t h e n  n u c l e a r  d e t e r r e n c e  w i t h  d e f e n s e s .  
For  some, t h e  i m p e r a t i v e  t o  dep loy  SDI t e c h n o l o g i e s  soon i s  a c u t e .  
Many would a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  Phase 1 concep t  shou ld  be 
pu r sued  because  i t  would commit t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  SDI, pe rmi t  nea r - t e rm 
( w i t h i n  7-10 y e a r s )  SDI deployment ,  and accommodate t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t  v iews  
of o f f e n s i v e  n u c l e a r  d e t e r r e n c e .  
A key i s s u e  f o r  t h o s e  who want t o  r e p l a c e  d e t e r r e n c e  i s  whe the r  t h e  
Phase  1 sys tem would p r o v i d e  enough p o p u l a t i o n  p r o t e c t i o n  ( a s  t h e y  s e e  
i t  1, g i v e n  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  o v e r  subsequent  phases  and t h e  f u t u r e  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of more advanced d e f e n s i v e  concep t s .  A second key i s s u e  f o r  
t h e s e  p e o p l e  i s  whether  t h e  Phase 1 sys tem s e r v e s  o n l y  t o  s h o r e  up 
o f f e n s i v e  n u c l e a r  d e t e r r e n c e  -- t o  which t h e y  o b j e c t  -- o r  whether  Phase  1 
deployment  i s  a n  a c c e p t a b l e  and n e c e s s a r y  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  d e t e r r e n c e  based  
on d e f e n s e s .  
A key i s s u e  f o r  t h o s e  who suppor t  near - te rm deployment o f  SDI t o  
s t r e n g t h e n  o f f e n s i v e  n u c l e a r  d e t e r r e n c e  i s  whether  t h e  c u r r e n t  c o n c e p t  of 
P h a s e  1  r e p r e s e n t s  a  premature  comnitment t o  p u r s u e  l i m i t e d  BUD 
t e c h n o l o g i e s .  A second key i s s u e  f o r  t h e s e  peop le  i s  whe the r  subsequen t  
fo l low-on phases  o f  more advanced SDI t e c h n o l o g i e s  w i l l  be f e a s i b l e .  
Yo. C r i t i c s  t a k e  e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h e  m i l i t a r y  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h e  Phase  1 
c o n c e p t  and make a  c a s e  t h a t  c u r r e n t  and p r o s p e c t i v e  U.S. n u c l e a r  f o r c e s  
a r e  a d e q u a t e  t o  d e t e r  S o v i e t  a g g r e s s i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  and i t s  
a l l i e s  and deny t h e  USSR i t s  wart ime o b j e c t i v e s .  They a s s e r t  t h a t  
n u c l e a r  d e t e r r e n c e  h a s  e f f e c t i v e l y  e l i m i n a t e d  t h e  t h r e a t  of  g l o b a l  
w a r f a r e ,  t h u s  e n s u r i n g  i n d i r e c t l y  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  of  t h e  U.S. p o p u l a t i o n  
a g a i n s t  n u c l e a r  a t t a c k .  Moreover, t h e y  would contend  t h a t  s u r v i v a l  of 
U.S. s o c i e t y  c o u l d  n o t  be  a s s u r e d  i n  t h e  f a c e  of a  d e t e r m i n e d  o r  
i r r a t i o n a l  a d v e r s a r y .  Fur thermore ,  any p o p u l a t i o n  d e f e n s e  a f f o r d e d  by 
Phase  1 deployment  would be mean ing le s s  g iven  t h e  d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s  of even  
a  few n u c l e a r  weapons. Some might a l s o  a r g u e  t h a t  c i v i l  d e f e n s e  measures  
a r e  l e s s  c o s t l y  and more e f f e c t i v e .  
Some b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  U.S. ICBM f o r c e  i s  n o t  v u l n e r a b l e  (and  t h a t  
mob i l e  ICBMs  a r e  even  l e s s  v u l n e r a b l e ) ,  and t h a t  t h e y  do  n o t  need t o  be 
de fended  by a  Phase  1 system. They add t h a t  warheads on U.S. bombers and 
submar ines  c o n t r i b u t e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t o  d e t e r r e n c e .  According t o  t h i s  
p e r s p e c t i v e ,  development  and deployment of Phase  1 t e c h n o l o g i e s  i s  
u n n e c e s s a r y  and p r o h i b i t i v e  i n  c o s t .  In a d d i t i o n ,  a  Phase 1 deployment  i s  
s e e n  a s  dange rous  because  it cou ld  c r e a t e  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  one  o r  t h e  o t h e r  
s i d e  t o  a t t a c k  f i r s t  i n  a  c r i s i s .  
These  opponen t s  would r e j e c t  t h e  argument t h a t  development  of a Phase  
1 sys t em (and  a  comnitment t o  phased deployment )  would compel t h e  S o v i e t s  
t o  r e l y  l e s s  on n u c l e a r  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s .  R a t h e r ,  i t  i s  a s s e r t e d ,  t h e  
S o v i e t s  c o u l d  p r o l i f e r a t e  t h e i r  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  f o r c e  a t  less c o s t  t h a n  
U.S. deployment  of SDI. The S o v i e t s ,  a r g u a b l y ,  cou ld  a l s o  d e v e l o p  and 
d e p l o y  a  h o s t  o f  measures  t o  c o u n t e r  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and s u r v i v a b i l i t y  
of t h e  Phase  1 system. 
O t h e r ,  l e s s  p r o v o c a t i v e ,  and l e s s  c o s t l y  a l t e r n a t i v e s  -- such  a s  arms 
c o n t r o l ,  mob i l e  ICBMs, and p a s s i v e  d e f e n s e s ,  f o r  example -- can  l e a d  t o  
f a v o r a b l e  changes  ( f o r  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s )  i n  S o v i e t  f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e  and 
s t r a t e g i c  s t a b i l i t y ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  view. T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e s e  o p t i o n s  
s h o u l d  be  pursued  i n s t e a d .  
Maybe. A t h i r d  p e r s p e c t i v e  i s  t h a t  t h e  U.S. s t r a t e g i c  d e t e r r e n t  
needs  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t o  remain c r e d i b l e  i n  t h e  eyes  of t h e  S o v i e t s ,  and 
t h a t  t h e  o p t i o n  t o  dep loy  SDI i n  some form shou ld  no t  be d i s m i s s e d  o r  
a c c e p t e d  w i t h o u t  c r i t i c a l  rev iew.  Here,  t h e  key i s s u e s  are which 
comparable  s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y  g o a l s  can be r eached  a t  l e a s t  c o s t  t o  
s t r a t e g i c  s t a b i l i t y  and w i t h  g r e a t e s t  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  On t h i s  p o i n t ,  i t  
c o u l d  be s a i d  t h a t  t h e  j u r y  i s  s t i l l  o u t .  
As s t a t e d  by t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  t h e  m i l i t a r y  mi s s ion  of  t h e  Phase  1 
sys t em i s  t o  enhance  s t r a t e g i c  s t a b i l i t y  i n  peace and c r i s i s  and p r e s e r v e  
a  c r e d i b l e  s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e  i n  t h e  even t  d e t e r r e n c e  f a i l s .  Accord ing  t o  
SDIO, t h e  pu rpose  of  Phase 1 deployment i s  t o  add u n c e r t a i n t y  t o  any  
S o v i e t  c a l c u l a t i o n s  of a t t a c k  a s  a  phase i n  an o v e r a l l  change  t o  a  d e f e n s e  
dominated  wor ld .  I n c r e a s i n g  S o v i e t  u n c e r t a i n t y  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  d e t e r r e n c e  -- many would p o i n t  o u t  -- compares r e a d i l y  w i t h  U.S. s t r a t e g i c  
m o d e r n i z a t i o n  o b j e c t i v e s  t o  dep loy  f o r c e s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  conv ince  t h e  
S o v i e t s  t h e y  canno t  a c h i e v e  t h e i r  p r i n c i p a l  war aims by a  n u c l e a r  a t t a c k ,  
n e u t r a l i z e  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  e n s u r e  con t inued  S o v i e t  p a r t y  c o n t r o l  i n  t h e  
USSR i n  t h e  e v e n t  of war,  and l i m i t  damage t o  t h e i r  w a r f i g h t i n g  
c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  
I f  t h e  Phase  1 deployment g o a l s  a r e  comparable w i t h  t h o s e  of 
s t r a t e g i c  m o d e r n i z a t i o n  and arms c o n t r o l ,  t hen  q u e s t i o n s  o f  c o s t  ( i n  a  
broad  s e n s e )  and e f f e c t i v e n e s s  become c r u c i a l .  C u r r e n t l y ,  no s t u d i e s  a r e  
a v a i l a b l e  a n a l y z i n g  Phase 1 deployment ,  comparing i t  w i t h  t h e  r a n g e  of 
s t r a t e g i c  p o l i c y  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  and a s s e s s i n g  t h e  v a r i o u s  t r a d e o f f s .  
N o n e t h e l e s s ,  some c r i t i c i s m s  of Phase 1  have begun t o  t a k e  shape.  One i s  
t h a t  l i m i t e d  d e f e n s e s  coupled  w i t h  e f f e c t i v e  o f f e n s i v e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  c a n  
i n c r e a s e  t h e  r i s k  of n u c l e a r  war, e s p e c i a l l y  i n  a  c r i s i s .  I ndeed ,  
P r e s i d e n t  Reagan warned o f  t h i s  i n  h i s  Mar. 23, 1983, s o - c a l l e d  " S t a r  
wars" s p e e c h ,  s a y i n g  t h a t  d e f e n s e s ,  " i f  p a i r e d  w i t h  o f f e n s i v e  sys t ems ,  
[ c o u l d ]  be viewed as f o s t e r i n g  a n  a g g r e s s i v e  p o l i c y ,  and no one  wan t s  
t h a t  ." 
A c r u c i a l  i s s u e  f o r  Phase  1 c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  minds of many 
o b s e r v e r s  i s  t h e  c u r r e n t  S o v i e t  n e g o t i a t i n g  p r o p o s a l  t o  r e d u c e  t h e i r  
s t r a t e g i c  warheads by h a l f ,  i n c l u d i n g  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  h a l f  o f  t h o s e  on  a l l  
SS-18 missiles. The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  has  long  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  t h e  SS-18s a s  
t h e  s i n g l e  most dangerous  and p r o v o c a t i v e  of S o v i e t  s t r a t e g i c  sys tems.  
Some have urged  t h a t  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  s e r i o u s l y  c o n s i d e r  t h e  S o v i e t  
o f f e r  because  i t  seen  a s  h i g h l y  c o m p e t i t i v e  w i t h  t h e  Phase  1 m i s s i o n  
o b j e c t i v e s ,  and i t  would c e r t a i n l y  c o s t  l e s s .  
ABM T r e a t y  and Phase  1 D e v e l o p a n t  and Deployment 
Deployment o f  t h e  Phase 1  e l emen t s  i s  i ncompa t ib l e  w i t h  t h e  ABM 
T r e a t y  ( and  i t s  1974 P r o t o c o l ) ,  which l i m i t  deployment t o  100 ground-based 
i n t e r c e p t o r s  a t  one s i t e  and a  ground-based ABM gu idance  and s e n s o r  
sys tem.  Moreover ,  many o b s e r v e r s  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  ABM T r e a t y  was des igned  
to restrict the development of a nationwide defense capability, though 
this is contested by Administration spokesmen and others. 
A key policy issue is therefore whether and when to abandon the ABM 
Treaty's constraints in pursuit of the President's vision of SDI. Those 
who agree with the ~dministration's plans for a Phase 1 system argue that 
the ABM Treaty should not stand in the way of developing a comprehensive 
defense system that would reduce the risk of nuclear war and make 
possible significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear 
forces . 
Another view maintains that Treaty limits on deployment of ABM 
systems have averted a potentially costly and dangerous offense-defense 
arms race. It is asserted that abandonment of the ABM Treaty would only 
result in a strategic environment made more complex and dangerous with the 
introduction of the limited capabilities envisaged for Phase 1 deployment. 
The potential for instability is further heightened by the inherent 
uncertainty of follow-on deployment capabilities, it is argued. 
Still others might suggest that the ABM Treaty could be amended to 
allow more than the limited deployment now permitted in ways that would 
retain the Treaty's central purpose of precluding deployment of a 
nationwide defense capability. 
Phase 1 development raises two crucial issues with respect to the ABM 
Treaty. The first is whether development and testing of some Phase 1 
elements is compatible with the traditional interpretation of the ABM 
Treaty, which prohibits testing and development of ABM componentp unless 
they are part of a fixed, ground-based ABM system. Although the 
Administration has said that SDI research, development, and testing will 
comply with the traditional interpretation, some people raise compliance 
questions over particular programs and tests, such as SBI. Some also 
believe concerns about potential conflicts with the Treaty will increase 
as Phase 1 proceeds. 
The second issue raised is whether Phase 1 development will soon 
require the adoption of a new (i.e., broader) interpretation of the ABM 
Treaty, which permits testing and development of ABM systems based on 
physical principles other than those in use in 1972, regardless of basing 
mode. The Administration has said that while this broader interpretation 
is legally justified, it would adhere to the traditional interpretation in 
conducting the SDI program. Congress also passed legislation having the 
practical affect of requiring any FY88 funds spent on SDI to be compliant 
with the traditional Treaty interpretation. 
Some argue, however, that the United States should soon adopt the 
broader interpretation to conduct realistic testing of some Phase 1 
technologies. They would add that doing so will save time and money, and 
reduce technological risk (because of being able to conduct realistic 
tests). 
Budgetary Issues and Phase 1 Deployment 
According to SDIO, current Administration cost estimates of the Phase 
1 system range between $75 billion and $150 billion (FY88) for the 
demonstration, validation, full-scale engineering development, and 
p r o d u c t i o n  of t h e  Phase 1 system. T h i s  r ange  of  c o s t ,  s a y s  SDIO, i s  due  
t o  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  of t h e  ha rdware  and 
a l t e r n a t i v e  a c q u i s i t i o n  app roaches .  These e s t i m a t e s ,  f o r  t h e  most p a r t ,  
1 I r e f l e c t  t h e  assumpt ion  of b u s i n e s s  a s  u sua l "  and do n o t  r e f l e c t  
r e d u c t i o n s  f o r  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  b reak th roughs ,  e f f i c i e n c i e s ,  management, o r  
p r o d u c t i o n  t e c h n i q u e s .  Launch c o s t s ,  a r g u e s  SDIO, a r e  reduced  i n  
acco rdance  w i t h  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  ALS. 
Some have  sugges t ed  t h a t  t h i s  SDIO c o s t  r ange  i s  h i g h l y  o p t i m i s t i c ,  
and t h a t  t h e  f i n a l  c o s t s  w i l l  a c t u a l l y  be much h i g h e r .  Many p o i n t  t o  t h e  
need f o r  g r e a t l y  reduced space- launch  c o s t s  t o  keep  down t h e  t o t a l  Phase  1 
sys tem deployment  c o s t s ,  which i s  n o t  i nc luded  i n  t h e  SDIO r a n g e ;  t h e y  
r a i s e  s e r i o u s  doub t s  a s  t o  whether  such  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o s t  r e d u c t i o n s  
e n v i s i o n e d  f o r  t h e  ALS can  be  a t t a i n e d .  
One budge ta ry  i s s u e  r a i s e d  t h e r e f o r e  i s  s imply  one  of a f f o r d a b i l i t y .  
The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  con tends  t h a t  t h e  Phase 1 deployment -- when s p r e a d  o u t  
o v e r  a  number of y e a r s ,  and i n c l u d i n g  c o s t  s a v i n g s  from o t h e r  U.S. 
s t r a t e g i c  n u c l e a r  weapons programs ( t h e  need f o r  which i t  i s  a rgued  would 
d e c l i n e  o v e r  t i m e )  -- i s  a f f o r d a b l e .  
O t h e r s  might  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  c o s t s  of  dep loy ing  t h e  Phase  1 sys t em 
canno t  be accomnodated i n  an e r a  of d e c l i n i n g  d e f e n s e  budge t s .  They 
con tend  t h a t  c o m p e t i t i o n  f o r  funds  w i t h i n  t h e  Defense Department w i l l  make 
f u n d i n g  a n  SDI phased development and deployment program i n c r e a s i n g l y  
d i f f i c u l t .  A t  t h e  same time, c o m p e t i t i o n  between c o n v e n t i o n a l  and  . 
s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e s  r e s e a r c h  and development funds  w i l l  become keene r .  
The p r o s p e c t  of  reduced  fund ing  f o r  t h e  development of  t h e  Phase  1 
s y s t e m ,  some wou ld  a r g u e ,  r a i s e s  an impor t an t  i s s u e :  Can t h e  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  pursue  t h e  c u r r e n t  Phase 1 concept  i n  a  f i s c a l l y  
c o n s t r a i n e d  env i ronmen t?  I n  many c a s e s ,  DOD weapons programs a r e  
" s t r e t c h e d  ou t "  o v e r  time t o  r educe  near - te rm c o s t s  o r  t o  cope w i t h  
reduced  b u d g e t s .  Should Phase 1 development be s t r e t c h e d  o u t ,  i t  might  
r e n d e r  Phase  1 deployment o b s o l e t e  because  i t  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  d e a l  w i t h  a  
mid- t o  l a t e -1990s  S o v i e t  t h r e a t .  A f t e r  t h e  l a t e  19908, t h e  c u r r e n t  Phase  
1 sys t em,  i f  dep loyed ,  might  be i n c a p a b l e  of  meet ing  t h e  c u r r e n t  m i s s i o n  
r e q u i r e m e n t s .  Budget c o n s t r a i n t s  t h e r e f o r e  cou ld  p l a y  a  d e c i s i v e  r o l e  i n  
d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  u l t i m a t e  f a t e  of t h e  c u r r e n t  Phase 1 concep t .  
A second major  i s s u e  conce rns  c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
h a s  con tended ,  and t h e  Congress  has  ag reed  th rough  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  t h a t  any  
deployment  of SDI must be  c o s t - e f f e c t i v e  a t  t h e  margin.  T h i s ,  t o  many, 
means t h a t  t h e  c o s t  t o  t h e  S o v i e t s  of m a i n t a i n i n g  a  g i v e n  l e v e l  of  
o f f e n s i v e  c a p a b i l i t y  would be g r e a t e r  t han  i t  would be  f o r  t h e  Un i t ed  
S t a t e s  t o  d e g r a d e  t h a t  c a p a b i l i t y  w i t h  d e f e n s e s .  Some A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
o f f i c i a l s  would a r g u e  t h a t  c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a t  t h e  margin ,  however, i s  
more t h a n  an  economic term. The i s s u e  i n  t h e  minds of many i s  how and 
when t o  c a l c u l a t e  c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s  f o r  dep loy ing  SDI: shou ld  t h e  Phase  
1 sys t em be c o s t - e f f e c t i v e  by i t s e l f  a g a i n s t  p o s s i b l e  S o v i e t  c o u n t e r s ,  o r  
shou ld  c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s  c r i t e r i o n  be c a l c u l a t e d  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  a  more 
comprehens ive ,  m u l t i p h a s e  s t r a t e g i c  d e f e n s e  system. Such i s s u e s  have  y e t  
t o  be  r e s o l v e d .  
Options for Congress 
Because pursuing Phase 1 will require funding approval, Congress 
will play an important role in determining the appropriate goal of the 
SDI program, as well as any deployment objectives. Briefly mentioned here 
for illustrative purposes only are some of the options the Congress could 
pursue in deciding upon SDI funding this year for development and testing 
of Phase 1 elements. 
Support the Phase 1 Concept 
Congress could endorse the Reagan ~dministration's plans for the 
demonstration and validation of Phase 1 elements, urge timely progress 
toward deployment of Phase 1, continue to fund Phase 1 without 
necessarily committing to its deployment, or grant the funding request 
without restrictions on the SDI program, or any of these concurrently. 
Modify the Phase 1 Concept 
Congress could support President Reagan by funding Phase 1 
demonstration and validation at the level of the Administration's request, 
seek to legislate balance (instead of relying on the Administration's 
assurances to do so) between demonstration and validation of Phase 1 
elements and longer-term programs (Phases 2 and 3, for example). Congress 
might also recommend that these longer-term, more advanced technologies be 
required to play a role in a different Phase 1 system to be deployed later 
than currently envisioned. 
Congress might also develop and pursue its own set of objectives for 
SDI through framework legislation and funding; deployment of SDI over the 
near- or long-term may or may not be a specific goal. 
Stop or Slow Developmnt of the Phase 1 Concept 
Congress might legislate balance between nearer- and longer-term 
technologies, while reducing significantly the overall SDI funding request 
in the aggregate to slow Phase 1 development or stop deployment. 
Congress might also prohibit development and testing of all or some Phase 
1 weapons elements, such as the space-based interceptor, to slow Phase 1 
development or stop deployment. 
Congress might seek to limit the general scope of SDI by approving 
greatly reduced funding levels and legislating various prograamatic 
restrictions. The purpose of slowing all or some of the SDI program (such 
as nearer-term technologies) would be to restrict the possibility of 
deploying SDI for an indeterminate period of time. 
LEG1 SLATIOY 
P.L. 99-145 
FY86 Defense Authorization Act. Requires that any strategic defense 
system deployed in whole or in part be survivable and cost-effective at 
the margin. Furthermore, funding for the deployment of such a system must 
be specifically authorized by legislation. Signed into law Nov. 8, 1985. 
